Saddam's Secrets Page 16

  Obviously Saddam had thought long and hard about this invasion which, if we actually carried it out, would be the most scandalous act of his entire regime. No doubt there would be some in the Arab world who would praise Saddam for accomplishing what no other Arab nation had ever done. After all, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had all failed and suffered humiliating defeats in the past by trying to overpower the Israelis. But to attack in such a fashion, with ninety-eight fighters and forbidden weapons, would bring forth an outcry from the civilized world that would no doubt be deafening.

  If even 10 percent of our aircraft made it into Israel and were shot down with chemical weapons on board, there would be tremendous loss of life. Thousands of Israelis would die in the first strike, and as the effect of the chemicals was dispersed, many thousands more would die. For Saddam, this was enough. This would be a victory for him, and he wasn’t worried at all about the consequences.

  He believed he would be hailed as a hero in the Arab world. After the Gulf War he bragged about firing SCUDs into the heart of Israel. He would say, “Iraq fired thirty-nine missiles into Israel. Who else has achieved such a great feat? Who will make it forty?” This is the way he thought. Even if we lost the war, the fact that he had fired thirty-nine missiles into that hated nation was all the victory he needed. He used to say, “We don’t need the Arabs to help us. Just give me a piece of land on the border of Israel and I’ll show you what the Iraqis can do.”

  But even though I knew what was in his mind, I felt compelled to call the palace and arrange to speak to Saddam one more time. This time I was on my own, but when I was given a chance to speak to him, I said, “Sir, I have seen the orders to launch the attack on Israel, and we all know what this means. But there’s something else I need to tell you, and I want to be sure that someone has done it. The Israelis have very advanced early-warning systems, and they have the ability to destroy any aircraft coming from the east before they ever cross the borders.

  “It’s possible,” I told him, “that some of our planes may slip through the web if they can exploit holes in the radar and come through in sufficient numbers. So even if you send aircraft with chemical weapons, it is possible that a few of them will actually get through. But I assure you, sir, that most of them will not. They will be destroyed, not over Israel but over Jordan and Syria. And if that happens, the whole world will say that you didn’t attack Israel, but that you attacked your own Arab people in those countries.”

  Saddam was listening but he didn’t speak, so I said, “Sir, you’re the commander, but you should know that most of our aircraft will not make it to Israel. It’s possible that maybe ten of them will penetrate the borders. If that happens, there will be chaos, and it’s certain the Israelis will retaliate with nuclear weapons. They have them, and if we strike in this fashion, you can be certain they will not hesitate to use them against us.”

  Defying Common Sense

  I knew that what I was saying was true because I had seen the plans. The Israelis had Pershing missiles they’d acquired from the Americans, and they had been modified to carry nuclear warheads. Those missiles were already targeted on Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, the three largest cities in Iraq. But logic also said that if Israel was attacked by chemical weapons, they would be within their rights to retaliate in any way they liked, even if it was with nuclear weapons.

  I knew that Israel’s military planners had already targeted three of our cities, but who could say it might not be six or eight cities? It was certainly true that the Israelis had plans for fighting all the Arab countries, and they were prepared to fight them one at a time or all at once, if need be. Their technology was (and still is) very advanced.

  Militarily, this only made sense, because whenever there was a fight between Israel and any one Arab country, the other Arab countries would all come as well. This was what happened during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Iraq wasn’t asked to be part of the alliance with Egypt and Syria, but Saddam wanted to go in anyway. So he sent our troops and aircraft without any agreement or authority to do so. The Israelis know this is what happens, and they’re prepared to fight not just one Arab country, but all of them if they must.

  I told all these things to Saddam, but he wouldn’t be dissuaded. He was determined that Iraq was going to attack Israel, regardless of the consequences. And just to make sure there was no turning back, he made another dramatic pronouncement. He called all the military commanders together once again and told them, “We will attack, so you must be ready. But I’m afraid that our enemies may find someone who looks like me and sounds like me, and they will put him on television and radio, and he will tell you not to attack. But I want you to listen to me: If this happens, do not believe them. Even if something happens to me, you must not stop. You must attack, and you must carry out all the plans I’ve given you, because this is a holy task and it must be done.”

  When that order went out to the commanders in the field, they were stunned. They were afraid of what would happen next. But the very next day the commander of the squadron of Mirage fighters our pilots would be using in the attack came to me with tears in his eyes, and he said, “Sir, our pilots will not be able to do this. There’s no way to fly this mission because the loads we’ve been asked to carry are much too heavy. The pilots won’t be able to keep the planes in formation. They’ll be flying at full power the whole flight with nothing in reserve.” He looked at me pitifully and said, “Please, sir, can’t you do something? At least let us practice flying under these conditions.”

  Understand that this was several days after December 17 when Saddam had first given the order to attack, and less than a month until the deadline of January 15, 1991, set by the United Nations, which was also the day I fully expected the coalition led by the Americans to attack Iraq. So there we were: less than a month from a coalition assault. The air force commanders had been ordered to get ready for a massive assault on Israel with chemical weapons, and they hadn’t even trained the pilots on how to fly under those conditions. So I went to see the air force commander, Gen. Muzahim, my former student, to tell him what was happening. I told him what I’d learned from the wing commanders and he was shocked. He said, “Georges, are you sure about this?” And I said, “Yes, sir, I’m sure. But why don’t you call the squadron commander and have him come here and tell you himself?”

  He did that, and when the commander came in, Gen. Muzahim asked him, “Is this true what Georges has told me? Your pilots haven’t trained for the attack carrying the special weapons?” The commander told him it was just as I had said, and he added, “Sir, how can our pilots carry all this heavy ordnance if they haven’t been shown what they’re supposed to do? And how can anyone expect them to make this attack, drop their payload, and then return to base if they can’t even refuel in flight?”

  Saddam’s Edict

  Here was something else that no one had considered. With such heavy loads, the fighters would expend all their fuel very quickly. Even if they were able to reach the targets with their onboard supply of fuel, they could never return; so somehow they would have to refuel in flight. But how do you do that on such a risky combat mission? They couldn’t use tankers, because tanker refueling takes place at very high altitudes which would clearly be seen by defensive radar, and the advantage of surprise would be lost. The only answer was that they would have to refuel by using other fighters, such as the Mirages that, instead of carrying weapons, could be reconfigured to carry jet fuel and apparatus for refueling the attack planes air-to-air. It was an unusual approach, but it could be done.

  This was another critical part of the mission for which the pilots had never trained, and unless they could successfully refuel before crossing into Israeli air space, it would be nothing short of a suicide mission. They could never return to base, so we would lose the pilots and the planes. And as brutal as Saddam was in his dealings with the military, even he was not willing to risk losing all his fighter pilots in that way. Remember, he wa
s preparing to send two flights, fully loaded, with a total of ninety-eight combat aircraft, gambling that at least ten of them would make it into Israel!

  Somehow I managed to get the commander’s attention, and he instructed his officers to begin training their pilots immediately to fly the mission under those conditions. By this time, it was already the twentieth of December, just a few weeks from the U.N. deadline, and our pilots began training for a mission they knew they would have to carry out, regardless of the cost. Saddam’s order had made it clear that there was no other option.

  Everyone in the army and air force had been on edge for weeks because of what they feared was coming. There could be no turning back. “Even if someone comes on the television who looks just like me,” Saddam had said, “don’t believe him. You must attack.”

  We know now that coalition forces were aware that Saddam might try to attack Saudi Arabia. I learned later, several weeks after the war, that it had even been reported on CNN and other networks at the time that Saddam was sending tank divisions toward the Saudi borders, apparently planning to attack in that area. Most people, however, had no idea what he was planning to do in Israel, and the story of that mission would not be revealed until now.

  What the world did see, however, was Saddam’s attempt to fire SCUD missiles at Tel Aviv, Haifa, and other Israeli targets within range. The Americans had come in and set up Patriot missile batteries all over the area, so on television in the U.S. and Europe, many people were able to watch those very dramatic events as they were actually happening. The Patriots were not terribly accurate, we now realize, but they were accurate enough to stop many of Saddam’s SCUDs, and just knowing that they were there seemed to calm the worst fears of people in Israel and the West. If they had known what all was on Saddam’s mind, I don’t think they would have felt quite so secure.

  In fact, when they were planning the attack on Israel in the early part of December 1990, none of the operations officers in Baghdad were talking about using SCUD missiles at all. The events that took place when I gave my briefing in the operations room on January 12, 1991, just three days before the U.N. deadline and five days before the attack, were very important, and I want to talk about that. But first, let me say something about the attacks on Israel.

  The plan signed by Saddam had the words across the top in his own handwriting, saying, “I agree to the attack, and we shall attack with the blessings of Allah.” The idea of hitting two countries simultaneously was remarkable enough, particularly when one of them (Israel) was considered an enemy country, and the other (Saudi Arabia) was not only not an enemy country, it was an Arab country on our southern border with which Iraq was supposed to have close ties. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was an Islamic country, the place where Mecca is located, a sacred site to all Muslims. Yet, Saddam had the arrogance to write those words on the order, and attacks on both countries were part of his plan.

  Saddam actually believed that God would bless him for attacking Israel with chemical weapons. And at the same time, he believed he would have the blessing of Allah when he attacked Saudi Arabia! It’s hard to imagine that kind of evil—to do such a thing, believing that God would bless his plan. I wish I’d kept a copy of that document to print here in these pages. Unfortunately, I don’t have it, but this is how he thought.

  When he was preparing the attack against Israel, Saddam would say, “If the Americans attack us in January, then we will hit Israel very hard.” The key word for anyone who followed the negotiations in those days was the word if, because it was the consensus among all our commanders that America (meaning, of course, the coalition forces) would not attack. During the Clinton administration, America never retaliated when their ships or bases or citizens were attacked. Instead, they would send Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to complain loudly and rattle her papers. But the military did nothing. No commander in the Middle East could ever respect such a response, particularly when the provocation was so strong. So our commanders were all saying, “You see? The Americans are weak. They’re afraid to fight, and they will never attack us.”

  Everyone believed this, but when I spoke to them, I said, “Look, the American and coalition forces that are here now standing by in the Gulf and the Red Sea are very expensive to maintain, and this build-up will cost the Americans billions of dollars. There’s no way they’re going to spend so much money for nothing. How would they explain to the American people that they’ve spent billions sending the army, air force, navy, and marines to the Middle East just to sit on their hands and do nothing? The news media would tear them to pieces. So, please, don’t tell me they won’t attack.”

  Meaningless Boasts

  By the middle of January 1991, things were incredibly hectic. Our army was in Kuwait, stealing everything in sight, and the news wasn’t good. The world had condemned Saddam and the invasion of Kuwait. The people were nervous about all this, and the military was in denial. When the minister of military affairs, Gen. Shanshal, called a meeting of the general staff for January 12, three days before the United Nations’ deadline to leave Kuwait, I thought that finally we’d be able to get to the bottom of what was happening.

  I took my seat next to the air force commander and looked to see who else was there. The minister of defense, the air force commander, the intelligence officers, the chiefs of staff and their deputies, as well as Gen. Shanshal who had been chief of staff for many years, were all present. Everybody, in fact, except Saddam himself. Gen. Shanshal had been named minister of military affairs in 1990, and everybody respected him and listened to him. He was a wise man and had been first in his class in the Staff College. So I was glad to see him there.

  His only problem was that he was afraid of Saddam and he would always do whatever Saddam wanted him to do. Like Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister, Gen. Shanshal had knowledge and ability, but he was incapable of acting on his own without first checking with Saddam. And if Saddam asked for information that was unfavorable to his schemes, Gen. Shanshal would say whatever Saddam wanted to hear. He wasn’t brave in that way, but Saddam loved him because he never said no.

  When the presentations began, a spokesman for Gen. Muzahim, the air force commander, went first, and then each officer spoke in turn. But I must say, they were the worst presentations I’d ever heard. If it weren’t so serious it would have been comical. They had no idea what they were talking about. The spokesman said, “No coalition aircraft will be able to penetrate Iraqi air space.” In fact, he said, “Not even a house fly can enter our air space without being intercepted by our fighters.” It was all I could do to keep from laughing. But then he went on to say, “We have the best radar, the best fighters, the best rockets, and we will obliterate any aircraft that tries to cross our border.” And it just went on like that, with examples of what would happen if fourteen, twenty, or thirty aircraft came at us from different directions and how we would respond. They were thinking like Saddam. It was pure fantasy, and not a word of it was true.

  Once they got through the presentations, Gen. Shanshal raised his hand and said, “General, may I ask a question?” Gen. Muzahim said, “Yes, sir. Please ask anything,” and Shanshal said, “Do you mean that our army and navy can move at will without any concern for possible attack from the air?” That was a great question and I was eager to hear the answer. Muzahim’s spokesman said very firmly, “Yes, sir, that’s correct. You can conduct operations without the slightest concern for any threats from the air.”

  I couldn’t believe my ears. What an incredibly stupid thing to say! But the real surprise was that Gen. Shanshal didn’t immediately say, “Shut up and sit down!” He didn’t say a word, and I simply couldn’t hold back any longer. I had to speak, so I said to the air force commander, “Gen. Muzahim, will you please stop this nonsense?”

  He looked at me and said, “Now, Georges, don’t interfere. And don’t say anything else.” But I couldn’t just sit there, so I said, “With all due respect, you know this is wrong!” I’m afraid
I was a bit loud, but it was such a ridiculous presentation I couldn’t restrain my emotions. So I said, “Look, I’m only an adviser and you all know that. Officially, I don’t have authority to challenge what you’re saying. But I must tell you that I don’t agree with any of your assessments. Gen. Muzahim, you are the air force commander and you’re responsible for the effectiveness of the air force and the air defense command. You are responsible for the lives of our soldiers and the safety of our country. And, sir, you must be reasonable.”

  At that point, Gen. Muzahim leaned over to me and whispered, “Georges, why are you being so difficult? I have to say this. You know I do. And besides, what are you worried about? There’s not going to be an attack.” Finally, I understood what was going on. Once again, these men were proceeding on the assumption that Ambassador Glaspie had assured Saddam that the Americans would not interfere and we were free to do as we pleased. So all the bravado and boasting were meaningless—done purely for show.

  Tactical Errors

  Nevertheless, I realized that giving an unrealistic presentation was dangerous, because the army officers in the room needed to know what sort of air support the ground forces would have, and what sort of defenses they would need in the event of an American assault. So I said, “I know what you’re saying, Muzahim. You can boast all you like to Saddam, but you cannot give a presentation like this to the officers of the military.”

  At that point Gen. Shanshal looked over at us and saw that Gen. Muzahim and I were talking seriously about something, but he didn’t say anything. Then, after a moment, I looked at him and raised my hand. Gen. Shanshal nodded at me and said, “Yes, Georges. Do you have something to say?” I said, “Yes, sir. I have many things to say.”