Saddam's Secrets Page 26

  A Direct Confrontation

  My most unforgettable conversation with Canon Andrew White took place in the fall of 2002 when he called from England to arrange an official visit to Baghdad. He told me he wanted to bring several members of the ICR in Coventry to talk about ways to improve the situation in Iraq. When he called on September 21, he said, “Georges, it’s very important that a group of us come to Iraq on the twenty-third of September. We already have our tickets and we’ll be coming to meet with Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister, as well as the foreign minister and President Saddam Hussein.”

  I thought this was very strange, indeed. No one could simply call and then come to Baghdad two days later and expect to meet with Saddam. So I said, “Excuse me, but why are you coming? And what are you hoping to accomplish here?” Andrew said, “I’ll tell you when we get there.” Get there? I thought. He wants to come and meet with three of the highest-ranking officials in the government, two days from now!? So I said, “Andrew, do you know what you’re asking for? How do you expect me to put something like that together in two days? Look, I’m willing to help make the arrangements for you, but that’s much too soon.”

  But the canon wasn’t dissuaded in the least. In fact, I think my hesitation was more of an incentive to him than anything else. He said, “Listen, Georges, you’ve got to help me. I know you’re an important man in Iraq and you can do this for us. It’s imperative that we come.” At that point I thought, I wonder who put him up to this? Surely somebody has told him to do this. Frankly, I wondered at first if the British prime minister’s office wasn’t behind it. But then I thought, Well, why not help him? At least I can try. So I said, “Okay, Andrew. I’ll do my best.”

  After I hung up the phone I immediately called Tariq Aziz, and he was amused by Andrew’s request. But when I explained everything to him, he told me, “Sure, let them come. We’ll work on it,” by which he meant that he would see if Saddam would be willing to meet with an English delegation. But no promises were made.

  Tariq Aziz said he would be willing to meet with the English visitors, and he also said that since the delegation would be in Baghdad for four days, he would see what else he could arrange for them to do. In the meantime, I went to see the ministers of religious affairs and foreign affairs to make arrangements for their visit, and then I also went to the residence office to arrange for our foreign guests to stay in the city. All of them were very helpful. If Andrew and his team were able to get their visas and travel arrangements completed in the U.K. on time, then they wouldn’t have any problems once they arrived in Iraq. Plans like that didn’t usually go so smoothly, but on this occasion I was able to get the job done with time to spare.

  Our “Invited” Guests

  When they arrived, everything was ready. No foreign visitors could come to Iraq without being accompanied by a member of the intelligence service, however. So an officer from the Mukhabbarat was assigned to them. These men call themselves tour guides, but everyone knows they’re only there to make sure that no secret transactions will be taking place. And they would also have a staff member from the ministry of foreign affairs traveling with them the whole time, to translate and to advise the delegation on protocol when necessary.

  When they first came to Iraq, I didn’t know most of them. I had never met John Holliman or Michael Smith who work with the ICR in London. Canon Andrew White, who became a friend and colleague during my time at Coventry, was especially gracious. Andrew is a tall and uninhibited young man and visibly passionate about his work. He refuses to be slowed down by obstacles—including even a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. Andrew was named to serve as emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury and director of the International Centre for Reconciliation in Coventry. I was named to head the ICR in Iraq.

  Our first meeting with Tariq Aziz was not very successful. Andrew and his friends were concerned that Iraq was on a collision course with the U.N., and they were very confrontational and demanding. Tariq Aziz was not pleased with their approach. Andrew made it clear that they were trying to prevent another war, and they said it was essential that Saddam allow the U.N. weapons inspectors to come back in, either on the first of October or the first of November.

  Tariq Aziz reprimanded Andrew and told him it wasn’t his place to tell President Saddam his business, at which time Andrew said, “Mr. Aziz, I hope you understand what I’m about to say to you, because I can’t say it more clearly than this. But if you don’t allow the inspectors to come back in, as I’ve just said, your country will be flattened.” That’s the word he used, “flattened,” and Tariq Aziz was upset that Andrew would speak to him in that way. And, honestly, I was surprised by it as well.

  Tariq Aziz said, “Reverend Andrew, you really shouldn’t be speaking to me like this.” But Andrew said, “Mr. Aziz, believe me when I say that I’m your friend. But I would be no friend if I didn’t speak honestly to you. I’m only saying this to make sure that you understand that the situation now is very, very intense, and President Saddam cannot continue to ignore and insult the whole world.”

  Andrew didn’t say that war was coming immediately or at some date certain. He wouldn’t have been permitted to go that far, I’m sure, but Andrew left little doubt that this was really the heart of what he had come to say. If Saddam continued to resist the United Nations weapons inspectors and thumb his nose at the world, as he had done consistently for the past five years, it was only a matter of time until the second Gulf War would begin.

  Tariq Aziz wasn’t the only one who was shocked by the confrontational approach our “invited” guests had taken. But Andrew’s message must have gotten through to Saddam because the inspectors were allowed back in before the November first deadline that Andrew had mentioned. When they arrived, the inspectors already had a list of sites to be examined, and they made quick work of it. But at one key site, they were stopped at the gate by security guards and weren’t allowed to go in.

  Saddam’s agents blocked the doors and claimed the site wasn’t on the list that had been approved by the president. The inspectors showed them the document and, sure enough, that building was on it. Nevertheless, the agents said, “No, you’re not coming in here, so you may as well leave now.” And that’s just what they did. They tried briefly to negotiate with officials from the ministry of defense to gain access to the site, but it didn’t work out, and that’s when the inspectors took their equipment and left Iraq for good.

  Taking the Other Side

  Tariq Aziz told me that he would speak to the president about the delegation and try to set up an appointment for them to meet with Saddam, but after a long series of frustrating delays, they still hadn’t been permitted to go to the palace. With only a few days until Andrew and his friends would have to fly back to England, I said, “Let’s see if we can get an appointment with Abdul Latif al-Hemayem, who is the secretary of the Islamic Conference and leader of Sunni Muslims in Iraq. He’s one of the most important sheiks of the Sunni tribes in the Sunni triangle. Maybe he can help.”

  Dr. Al-Hemayem was very close to Saddam. He had made the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hadj) on Saddam’s behalf. Islam allows those who cannot go on Hadj to send a substitute in their place, and Hemayem was the one who went for Saddam. He had also made a copy of the entire Koran by his own hand with Saddam’s blood. He also happened to be the owner of the Islamic Bank of Iraq and a close personal friend of Saddam, so meeting with him would be an important step. When we arrived at Dr. Al-Hemayem’s office, Andrew gave him a letter that explained what he wanted to say to Saddam.

  At two o’clock in the afternoon, the Sunni leader agreed to call the palace and set up a meeting, and he said we would be able to see Saddam at eight o’clock that evening. Then he gave Andrew a beautiful abaya, which in this case was a long gentleman’s robe worn by Arab sheiks, and he gave him two more to take back to England—one for Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and one for George Carey, the former Archbishop. They were very elegant gifts, a
nd Andrew was obviously pleased to receive them.

  We went back to the Al Rashid Hotel at that point and waited expectantly for a call. But eight o’clock came and went and nothing happened. At one thirty in the morning we were still waiting, but the call never came. The delegation also included two English vicars. Both of them were military officers in the chaplaincy, one a colonel and the other a lieutenant colonel. We all waited there together for two more days, but eventually Andrew and the others decided they would have to give up and return to England. Before they left, however, Andrew requested one more meeting with Tariq Aziz, and when that last meeting took place he disclosed there was going to be a meeting of parliament very soon in which the issue of Iraq would be discussed.

  “There will be a vote,” he said, “on whether or not Britain should go to war against your country as a member of the multinational coalition led by the United States.” But then Andrew said, “Mr. Aziz, don’t you think you ought to have someone you trust at that meeting?” He looked across the room at me and said, “We would like to recommend that you send General Sada, who speaks very good English, and he can report back to you on what happens in London.”

  I could see that Andrew was concerned about the likelihood of another war, and he was worried about my safety. But it wasn’t just the war that concerned him. After the hard way he had spoken to these highly placed government officials, Andrew was afraid that someone might want to hurt me. I had put myself in harm’s way by arranging the meetings, and Andrew had not attempted to spare the deputy prime minister’s feelings when he spoke to him so bluntly.

  As the deputy prime minister and confidant of Saddam, Tariq Aziz had immediate access to the president. Saddam was both president and prime minister, as well as the head of the revolutionary council, which was the most powerful group in the country. And he was the commander-in-chief of the military, so as Saddam’s chief deputy Tariq Aziz had a great deal of authority. He would certainly want to know if the British Parliament voted in favor of another war with Iraq, and sending me as an insider would be a prudent step for him to take.

  A Timely Exit

  I was convinced that another war was the last thing we needed. Sanctions and corruption were already destroying the country. But my strong convictions about the need for a more conciliatory relationship between America and Iraq made Saddam and his deputies, including Tariq Aziz, more suspicious of me. I didn’t know whether they would give me permission to go with Andrew or not, but I was ready to go and hopeful the answer would be yes.

  After he considered Andrew’s suggestion, Tariq Aziz said, “Yes, I think it’s a good idea. Why don’t you take Georges with you to England?” And then to me he said, “Georges, I agree that you should go to London, and I want you to attend that meeting of Parliament. I would like to know what happens there, and I will be very happy if you call me any time, day or night, and tell me exactly what they decided at that meeting.”

  Then after telling me to go with Andrew, he took a notepad from his desk and wrote some numbers on it. He handed me the slip of paper and said, “Georges, I’m giving you two telephone numbers. These are private numbers, and no one else answers these telephones but me. As soon as you go to the meeting and find out what they’re thinking, I want you to call me on one of these numbers and tell me in detail what took place. Do you understand?” And I said, “Yes, sir. I understand, and I will be glad to do that.”

  What Andrew had not told him was that the parliamentary meeting that would be taking place was not the political body that sits at Westminster but the clerical body composed of members of the clergy. Most people know that the primary political bodies of the English Parliament are the House of Lords and the House of Commons. But there is a third body, the Synod, which represents the Church of England, which is the state church. The Synod has a voice in legislation whenever social, cultural, or religious matters are involved. That was the meeting that Andrew and I were going to attend.

  I was so happy to be given permission to go with Andrew to England. I breathed a silent prayer: Thank you, God. You’ve saved me from the mouth of the lion! Even though I was well known in Iraq, and generally well respected by Saddam and his deputies, they knew that on this issue I was with the other side. Saddam was adamant about resisting the West and continuing to build his own power, but I knew that was a suicide mission, and I was becoming more and more aggressive in my own involvement with the movement for reconciliation. I dreaded the prospect of another war, and this made Saddam and Tariq Aziz wary of me.

  No one in the government had forgotten that I’d been imprisoned for a short time after my debate with Qusay Hussein, and I had been sent back into retirement for the second time. But there was never any effort on my part to undermine the government. I was concerned for my people, and that’s why I was eager to join the reconciliation movement and encourage Saddam to allow the inspectors to come back and finish their job.

  But going to London at that time proved to be a real blessing. This was especially true since my family were all out of the country as well. The only problem was that, under Iraqi law, at least one member of the family had to remain in Iraq at all times. It was like the Soviet system in that way: if a son or daughter went abroad, at least one parent had to remain behind. If both parents went abroad, at least one child had to remain behind. In this case, I was going to England while my family members were all outside the country; but I was going with the blessings of the deputy prime minister and, indirectly, of the president himself. So once the clearances had been given and my travel documents were ready, we left Baghdad and I traveled with Andrew’s delegation back to the U.K. on September 27, 2002.

  An Unavoidable War

  When I got to England, it didn’t take long to realize that the game was up. It was obvious from everything I saw and heard—newspapers, television, conversations in the street. And when I observed the political mood of the country, I realized that Prime Minister Blair and the members of parliament, for the most part at least, were convinced that another war with Iraq was unavoidable. The only question was when.

  When I visited the British Foreign Office at Whitehall, in London, they told me they were very concerned about conditions in Iraq. Saddam’s obstinate denial to allow full access to our weapons facilities, and his attempts to mislead the U.N. and confuse the issue, were having the opposite effect of what Saddam intended. Before I left, I offered the military planners some counsel that I felt was very important. I said, “If it turns out that Britain and America conclude that you must attack again, please do not attack the whole country as you did in the first Gulf War. Attack only the targets that will weaken the regime, but please don’t destroy the infrastructure, the bridges, the homes, and the property that belongs to the people.”4

  Then, on November 11, 2002, I was in the gallery when the members of the Synod met to deliberate our fate. Even before we entered the chambers at Westminster, everyone knew I was there. I had been introduced as an air vice marshal and a delegate of the Iraqi government, and they proceeded to discuss the situation in Iraq and the Middle East at length. I listened intently, and I was amazed as the deliberations went back and forth, often with great intensity. When they concluded the discussion, however, a vote was taken to determine whether or not that body would be willing to support a resolution of war.

  As it turned out, there were 121 votes by members of the Synod in favor of going to war with Iraq with the authorization of the United Nations, and 142 votes in favor of joining the coalition led by the United States without going through the U.N. This was an overwhelming decision. Either way, whether with or without the U.N., they had agreed that war with Iraq was the only option.

  I immediately called Tariq Aziz using one of the phone numbers he had given me, and I said, “Sir, the war has been declared against us, so please do something. You must speak to the president and tell him what’s happening.” We spoke for nearly twenty minutes, and I gave him as much detail about the meeting as I could,
offering my own suggestions. But I had no idea what he would actually do. Tariq Aziz was really shaken by this news. He said, “Georges, how could they make such a decision? What made them decide to go to war against us?” He asked me, “Did you see the Archbishop of Canterbury?” I said, “Yes, sir, I saw him. He’s here, and all the clergy are here. They are all agreed that war is unavoidable.”

  I told him that as of that date, November 11, 2002, war was already declared against us. But neither Tariq Aziz nor any of the members of the Iraqi government seemed to understand what that would mean. Instead, Tariq Aziz said, “Georges, I want you to stay there and wait for me. I’m coming to Europe on the fourteenth of February. I will have an audience with the pope in Rome on that day. I’m sure he will be able to do something about this and tell them to stop the war.”

  “February?” I asked, incredulously. “Sir, do you understand what’s happening? The fourteenth of February is three months away and a lot can happen before that.” It was obvious that he had no idea how serious our situation had become. With the Synod, the British Parliament, the United States Congress, and the United Nations now demanding that Iraq come to terms with the rest of the world, it should have been obvious that an invasion could come at any time, and Tariq Aziz was talking about waiting three months for an audience with the pope that, more than likely, would have no effect at all.

  So, again, I said, “Sir, that’s too long, and, believe me, the pope will do nothing.” At that point, I was convinced that war was inevitable. But Tariq Aziz didn’t believe me.