Saddam's Secrets Read online

  Perricos didn’t mention the Syrian connection, but field reports from Iraqi informants and information supplied by the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, confirmed that members of Syria’s Baath Party were very much involved. And two months prior to the UNMOVIC report, U.S. officials received word from the Jordanian intelligence service that they had broken up a plot by Al Qaeda to explode a large chemical weapon in the center of Amman, Jordan.

  The plot masterminded by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was designed to create a “toxic cloud” in the city that would permeate not only the U.S. Embassy but also the office of the prime minister of Jordan and the intelligence service headquarters. The collateral effect would lead to the death or serious impairment of at least twenty-thousand Jordanian civilians.

  During the operation to foil this diabolical plot, the Jordanian agents captured several of the terrorists involved, as well as some twenty tons of nerve gas and Sarin gas that were to be used in the attack. No one could say where the biological and chemical agents had come from, but there was only one logical source. They were, more than likely, merely a small portion of the contraband that had been shipped out of my country by Saddam, and that had now fallen into the hands of a notorious terrorist whose base of operations since the early days of the Gulf War has been in Iraq.

  Life After Saddam

  I assure you that most Iraqis were shocked and surprised by the way Saddam was captured—dirty, frightened, and hiding in a spider hole. For thirty years that man tried to make everyone believe he was invincible. He smoked his big cigars and fired his weapons in the air, always strutting before the TV cameras. The first report on every news broadcast and the main headline of the daily newspaper had to be about Saddam every single day. But on that day, December 13, 2003, there he was for the whole world to see, and there was nothing brave or inspiring about it. He was just another coward running from justice.

  If Saddam had decided to fight and die like a man, I suspect he would still be admired by some people in my country. Those who loved him would say he was a hero who fought for what he believed in. But he lost all respect after being captured with a pistol he didn’t even try to use. It would have been better for him to have been killed, or even to have killed himself, rather than surrender. But, instead, he was dragged from a hole like an animal.

  Now the world will see him standing trial before a special tribunal. The charges against him are very serious, and I have no doubt he will be convicted. Even his own lawyers know that Saddam is guilty. In one interview, Abdul Haq al-Ani, who was hired by Saddam’s daughter to head the defense team, told reporters that he thinks Saddam is “despicable” for the illegal imprisonment and torture of innocent Iraqis. The only reason he accepted the case, he said, was because he is anti-American and defending Saddam was his way of showing it. But he will, in any event, have a hard case to prove, and the charges against his client are enormous.

  Among the many serious charges, Saddam will be accused of the massacre of Kurds at Anfal in 1987–88, in which nearly two hundred thousand were killed or expelled from the country. He will be charged with ordering the bombardment of Kirkuk, and the slaughter of thousands of Shia Muslims who were buried in mass graves in the south. He will be charged with the chemical attacks on Kurds at Halabja in 1988, and execution of eight thousand members of the Barzani tribe—which happens to be the family of the president of the Kurdistan region. And these are just a few of the most notable accusations Saddam and his lawyers will have to deal with.

  Eighty percent of the people of Iraq are eager for this trial to begin and for justice to be served. Another 15 percent don’t really care one way or the other; they’re just glad to know that Saddam is gone and they’re alive. There is, however, a small group of “Saddamists” who still feel loyalty for him because they had prospered under his corrupt regime. But I can also tell you that there is another large group, made up mainly of journalists and broadcasters and officials of foreign governments, who were paid very large sums by Saddam to say and print nice things about him. Hundreds of people in newsrooms and network boardrooms all over Europe and the Middle East are learning how to live on less these days, since the bribes and the extortion money that was being paid to them by Saddam has suddenly dried up.

  A Personal Appeal

  As a former fighter pilot and an air force general who has been engaged in wars and revolutions throughout my entire career, I know what war means, and I understand what these weapons can do. And this is why, in 1998, I began working with organizations dedicated to peace and reconciliation in the Middle East. Since that time I’ve led the International Center for Peace and Reconciliation and I’ve been awarded the “Cross of Nails” at Coventry Cathedral in England, which was a very great honor. Seven months after the liberation of Iraq, on November 14, 2003, I was awarded the International Peace Prize at Coventry.

  All of this happened because I believe sincerely that our part of the world needs peace—not just in Iraq, but peace throughout the Middle East. And we have to learn how to live in peace with others if we are to survive. It’s in this spirit that I have decided to issue an appeal to my brother in the Middle East, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who is a young and gifted leader, not to withhold the truth about these matters any longer.

  I’m asking President Bashar now to tell the world the truth about the WMDs and then to hand them over to a neutral organization that will make sure they’re transported out of Syria and disposed of in an appropriate manner. Whether it’s the United Nations, the Red Cross, or some other international body, these weapons and everything else sent there by Saddam Hussein need to be handed over in order to bring this troublesome matter to a close. To possess them is a threat to world peace, and using them would be a crime that can only end in even greater tragedy. Now is the time to dispose of them.

  If President Bashar will take this important step, it will earn him and his nation the goodwill of the entire world, and it will help to solve many problems that have been created by Syria’s poor relations with its neighbors in the past. As an Iraqi general and now a director of peace initiatives in the Middle East, I can think of no more important action than this for restoring hope and prosperity to our region.

  Fifty years of fighting between our two countries is enough. Fifty years of bloodshed, the loss of millions of our sons, the devastation of hundreds of towns in Syria, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, and the waste of billions of dollars of our national treasure that could have fed and clothed the people of our countries, is a terrible price to pay for our pride and resentment.

  So this is my plea, and I say it with all my heart: Mr. President Bashar al-Assad, please turn over these weapons. Let the United Nations take them away, and the whole world will thank you for it.

  CHAPTER 11

  THE WAY FORWARD

  The International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR) was established in Iraq in 1998 when Canon Andrew White made his first trip to meet with me in Iraq. On that occasion Andrew and I laid out the general guidelines for the work ahead based on our commitment to creating an environment in which people of all faiths and backgrounds could speak freely and resolve their differences without fear or the threat of intimidation. After Andrew returned to Coventry, I took steps to organize the operations in Iraq, and since that time the activities of the group have grown tremendously. The outreach of this movement has expanded, and my own responsibilities have expanded even more.

  As director of ICR in Iraq, my mission was to help encourage the various groups in the region to talk through their problems rather than immediately resorting to verbal or physical attacks. The work was slow and sometimes dangerous, but we could see signs of progress as we persevered. One of the most important events took place on February 24, 2004, when Canon White and I moderated a large convocation of tribal and religious leaders who had come together to talk about our common concerns. We met at the Babylon Hotel where, at the conclusion of that meeting, we drafted a do
cument called the “Baghdad Religious Accord,” which called for religious and ethnic tolerance in Iraq.

  Following the signing of that document by leaders of all faiths, we established a new entity to serve as a center for dialogue and reconciliation. This effort was originally funded by the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative at Coventry Cathedral. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C., was also instrumental in organizing and helping to plan our activities. We decided to choose a name for the new organization as close to USIP as possible, and that’s how the Iraqi Institute for Peace (IIP) came into being.

  I had served as director of the International Centre for Reconciliation since 1998 and served the new organizations in a similar capacity until February 2004 when I left to assist with the creation of the new Iraqi ministry of defense. They found other people to manage the IIP, though I returned to help resolve some of the problems that emerged after my departure.

  I took no salary or stipend when I served in those positions for seven years. As a Christian, I was giving a tenth of my income to the church, so I often used my own money to host visitors or do other things for the IIP and its affiliates. Eventually an order came from the USIP saying they would only send funds for operation of the institute to me personally. So even though my duties had expanded many times over, I am still working with them, and I serve today as executive secretary of the IIP in Iraq.

  Reconciliation and Rebuilding

  Since 2004, the work of the IIP has grown to include hostage negotiation, mercy missions, intervention in cases of religious persecution, and many other things. We have met with Sunni leaders from all the different areas, and we worked closely with them in selecting the fifteen individuals from that region to serve on the committee drafting the new national constitution. We have hosted conferences for as many as a thousand people at a time, and I also began working with Sunni leaders to improve relations between the tribes and religious groups in the northern part of the country. In the beginning, the British Foreign Office funded those meetings, but today American organizations are doing it.

  But then on March 21, 2004, I was called to a meeting with American Ambassador Paul Bremer and Mr. Brusqa Nuri Shawez, who is a prominent leader of the Kurdish people in Iraq, to sign the new law creating the ministry of defense. On that day we began building our military forces, and Mr. Shawez was named to the post of General Secretary of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Six weeks later, on May 10, 2004, I was sent to Washington, D.C., for a special course designed for new members of the senior executive service, which is the highest level of civil service in the government of the new Iraq.

  I had been nominated to become the spokesman for the ministry of defense and director of public affairs in that office. But while I was awaiting further word on the nomination, I received a call from the director of the Office of National Security Affairs (ONSA) in Baghdad, Fred Smith, who said, “General Sada, I want to be the first to congratulate you on being appointed spokesman for the new prime minister of Iraq.” That was very good news, so I said, “Thank you, sir, but who is the new prime minister?” And he said, “Nobody knows. But you’re already appointed, and the new government will be in place on June 1.”

  That conversation took place on May 24, 2004, and I was excited to see what would happen next. Later that day I was contacted by the Department of State and they told me, “Georges, on May 26 you’re scheduled to meet with Secretary of State Colin Powell, and he’s going to introduce you to a very important person who will be going to Iraq.” So two days later I went to that meeting and I was introduced to Secretary Powell. We talked for some time about the situation in Iraq and how my work was going, and he was very warm and encouraging. Then after a few minutes, he said, “General Sada, I want to introduce you to this man, John Negroponte. He’s going to be the American ambassador to Iraq.”

  I was delighted to meet Ambassador Negroponte. As the principal representative of the United States to our country, he was going to be an important person for us. We shook hands and he said, “Georges, it’s a pleasure to meet you. I’ve heard so much about you.” And then he told me, “When I come to take my post in Iraq, even before presenting my papers to the government, I want to see you and say hello.” So I said, “Yes, I hope you will do that. And call me at the prime minister’s office when you arrive.” I gave him my business card, and sure enough he did call when he arrived in Baghdad one month later, and we spoke briefly before he went in to be presented to the prime minister.

  On May 28, 2004, I was organizing my office, awaiting the arrival of the new prime minister. At one point I said to Ambassador Bremer, “Come on, sir. Tell me who’s going to be the new prime minister.” And he said, “Believe me, Georges, I don’t know.” I said, “Sir, that’s just three days from now. Surely somebody must know who it’s going to be.” Well, along the way I got the slightest hint that it might be Dr. Ayad Alawi, but it wasn’t until June 1 that I actually knew for sure. It was Dan Senor, the spokesman for Ambassador Bremer, who introduced me to Dr. Alawi.

  Actually, we had met two months earlier when I was in the ministry of defense and we both attended graduation ceremonies in Jordan for our new brigade commanders. Dr. Alawi was a member of the governing council at that time and head of the Iraqi National Accord, which was his political party. Previously, he had been living in London for more than twenty years.

  Dr. Alawi took his duties seriously from the start, and Ambassador Bremer began handing the affairs of government over to him almost immediately. We were very busy for the next twenty-eight days, preparing for a formal exchange from an American administration to an all Iraqi administration. We were originally scheduled to finish everything on June 30, but we finished two days early.

  Ambassador Bremer, who was supposed to leave Iraq on the thirtieth, came around to the prime minister’s office on June 28 and said, “Good job, gentlemen. You’ve got everything now, and I’m leaving today.” This surprised everybody, especially the media. But there was no reason for him to stay. We finally had a new government in Iraq, and it was being run by Iraqis. Ambassador Negroponte arrived that afternoon, and from that moment we began rebuilding the government of Iraq.

  Fighting for Nothing

  On March 21, 2004, I met with Fred Smith at ONSA in Iraq, and with David Gompert, who was the senior advisor for security policy under Ambassador Bremer. I was briefed on plans for the new ministry of defense. They told me that there was to be a meeting of Iraqi leaders, and The New York Times would be there. The pictures and proceedings of the meeting couldn’t be made public at that time, but photographers would be there to record the occasion, and details would be published at some time in the future.

  I went to the meeting and many pictures were taken. When we signed the document creating the new ministry of defense, I felt that my years of military service were finally being rewarded. At last my country would have a military we could be proud of. We found a building for it, and today that ministry and the new government are in business. I was proud to be there as spokesman for the minister of defense, whomever that turned out to be. Later they announced that the nominee for the position would be Dr. Ali Alawi, who was a member of the governing council and had also been named as minister of commerce and trade. For several months, while the government was being organized, Dr. Ali Alawi actually served in three separate posts.

  From March 21 to May 10, 2004, we made plans for the structure of the ministry of defense, deciding on key posts to be filled in the administration. During that time I was asked for my suggestions about the shape of the new army in Iraq. Among other things, I told them that the three divisions they originally planned wouldn’t be enough. I said we needed at least nine divisions and 150,000 uniformed personnel, but ten divisions would be even better. Fortunately, they agreed with me, and since that time the number has increased from nine to eleven divisions.

  When the 101st Airborne Division was withdrawn from Iraq to return to America, Major General David
Petraeus was promoted to Lieutenant General and given the assignment of training the new Iraqi Army. I can tell you that he is doing a great job, and he works from early in the morning until late at night. I’ve seen him there at the defense ministry until late in the evening. He’s a faithful officer, and he knows how important it is to train the Iraqi soldiers to take over the job of defending the country; I’m very proud of the work he has done.

  The hard job for the military now is mainly in the five provinces where the insurgency has been such a problem—Diahla, Ramadi, Baghdad, Saladin, and Mosul Provinces. These are mainly the Sunni Provinces. Saddam was from that area, and even though the Sunni Arabs make up only about 25 percent of the population of Iraq, they were very much in control under the old regime. Now that they no longer have the advantage, the Sunni leaders are struggling with how to best achieve their objectives. And sometimes they’re doing it the wrong way. For example, many Sunnis decided to boycott the elections in January 2005. That was a huge mistake, and they paid a heavy price for it by not getting their people elected to important positions.

  There were many officers and soldiers from this area serving in the Republican Guard and the special security forces under Saddam. Many of those men are in the insurgency now because they feel they’ve been neglected. Also, they realize that they will never regain the same level of power that they had before liberation. They believe the insurgency will help them regain their power, but I can assure you this will never happen. Ultimately, they’re not fighting with America; they’re fighting their own people and their own government, and this needs to stop.